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I. INTRODUCTION 
Feed-in tariffs, or FITs, are minimum guaranteed resale prices 
for renewably produced energy usually set by public or quasi-
public authorities.1 Exemplary of a new generation of subsidies 
that are designed to stimulate the green economy, their use within 
an increasingly more profitable sector highlights the growing 
antagonism that exists between the current rules of the multilateral 
trading system and environmental issues.2 The World Trade 
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 1. For the purposes of this paper, renewable energy means energy 
produced by solar, wind, geothermal and tidal processes. 
 2. See, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Global Clean Power: A $2.3 Trillion 
Opportunity 73, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (2010), available at http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_warming/G20-
Report-LowRes.pdf. 
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Organization (“WTO”)3 has admittedly not been completely 
indifferent to environmental issues in the past.4 Progress in the 
current Doha Round of negotiations, however, has stalled and 
shows little sign of improving.5 In particular, the lack of a 
negotiating mandate for a substantive agreement on renewable 
energy subsidies within the WTO creates tensions between 
subsidies permissible under existing WTO law and those aimed at 
promoting the generation of renewable energy, leaving such 
subsidies vulnerable to legal challenge. This has manifested itself 
in the submission of three international trade disputes involving 
renewable energy subsidies to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
(DSM) of the WTO in the past two years.6 The two most recent 
disputes, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector (hereinafter “Canada—Renewables”) 
                                                                                                             
 3. The World Trade Organization is the organization within which 
multilateral international trade agreements are negotiated, concluded and 
enforced. It was created in 1994 and was preceded by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
 4. Notable actions by the World Trade Organization (WTO) include the 
creation of a Committee on Trade and the Environment, the inclusion of select 
environmental issues in the negotiating mandate of the current Doha Round, and 
the explicit recognition that the WTO holds to tools to promote climate change 
mitigation. Decision on Trade and Environment, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/56-dtenv.pdf (creating 
the Committee on Trade and the Environment); World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration, Nov. 14, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 
¶¶31-32 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/ 
min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf (negotiating the Doha Round); Director-General Pascal 
Lamy, Speech at the Informal Trade Ministers Dialogue on Climate Change in 
Bali, Indonesia (Dec. 9, 2007), transcript available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm (acknowledging the environmental goods 
and services the Doha Declaration could provide). See also, Deputy Director-
General Harsha V. Singh, Speech at the International Center for Trade and 
Sustainable Development Trade and Climate Change Symposium in Durban, 
South Africa (Dec. 5, 2011), transcript available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news11_e/envir_05dec11_e.htm#speech. 
 5. See, Goodbye Doha, Hello Bali, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 8, 2012), 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21562196.  
 6. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures 
Concerning Wind power equipment, WT/DS419/1, Jan. 6, 2011, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds419-1(cr).pdf [hereinafter “China—Wind 
Turbines”]; Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Japan, Canada—Certain 
Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, WT/DS412/5, Jun. 
7, 2011, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/ pr/ds412-5(pr).pdf 
[hereinafter “Canada—Renewables”]; Constitution of the Panel Established at the 
Request of the European Union, Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff 
Program, WT/DS426/6, Jan. 24, 2012, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149293.pdf [hereinafter “Canada—Feed-in Tariff”]. 
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and Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program 
(hereinafter “Canada—Feed-in Tariff”), both concern the legality 
of the FIT program adopted by the Canadian province of Ontario, 
and should be adjudicated by a panel in the near future.7  
In the absence of a WTO agreement specifically regulating 
renewable energy subsidies, this Comment has as its aim the 
elucidation of lessons that can be drawn regarding permissible 
subsidies for the promotion of renewable energy production within 
the WTO. After describing the anatomy of a FIT and the 
arguments for renewable energy subsidies in Part II, this Comment 
will outline the framework and history of subsidy regulation within 
the WTO Agreements in Part III.8 Parts IV, V, and VI will analyze 
the WTO Agreements and relevant Dispute Settlement 
Understanding jurisprudence to proffer four lessons for 
policymakers that should be borne in mind throughout the design 
and implementation stages of renewable energy support measures. 
These lessons aim to ensure legality at three levels of analysis: 
first, the possibility of general, non-specific government support 
that would not fall within the WTO definition of subsidies will be 
explored; second, the paramount lesson of non-discrimination for 
government support measures that do fall within the WTO 
definition will be highlighted; finally, two lessons that are aimed at 
ensuring that support measures fall within an “environmental 
exception” potentially available under Article XX of the 1994 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will be 
discussed.  
Set against the impasse in the Doha Round negotiations—now 
in their twelfth year—this Comment adopts a realistic approach, 
which recognizes the unlikelihood of a multilateral agreement 
clarifying the status of renewable energy subsidies within the 
WTO in the near future. The objective desirability of subsidies 
should force policymakers to take heed of the WTO rules in the 
design and implementation of support measures for renewable 
energy.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 7. Canada—Renewables, supra note 6; Canada—Feed-in Tariff, supra 
note 6.  
 8. The Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization and Annexes, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
(1994); Marrakesh Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994). 
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II. THE ANATOMY OF A FIT AND THE ARGUMENT FOR RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SUBSIDIES 
As previously noted, feed-in tariffs, or FITs, are policies 
adopted by public or quasi-public bodies that guarantee the 
producer of renewable energy a fixed resale price for an agreed 
period of time should certain conditions be met.9 In order to 
stimulate energy production by renewable methods, the guaranteed 
price is inevitably above market price for a significant period of 
time to provide both security and meet the opportunity cost of the 
investment to the energy producer. An illustrative example is the 
Ontarian FIT at the center of the Canada—Renewables and 
Canada—Feed-In Tariff disputes. Run by the Ontario Power 
Authority, a body that was created by provincial government 
statute in 2004,10 the program allows both large-scale (above ten 
kilowatts) and small scale (less than ten kilowatts)11 private energy 
producers with qualifying renewable energy fuel sources 
(including solar photovoltaic cells, water, wind and bioenergy 
production systems)12 to resell generated energy back onto the 
Ontario electricity grid at a fixed price for a twenty-year period.13 
Based on this contract, the guaranteed price paid can be up to nine 
and one-half times that of the cost price of electricity to general 
consumers, with the possibility of annual price increases for 
eligible projects.14 Similar FIT schemes have been pursued around 
                                                                                                             
 9. Conditions include the use of certified renewable energy generating 
equipment. See Marie Wilke, Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO 
Subsidy Rules: An Initial Legal Review, ICTSD PROGRAMME ON TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT, TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SERIES 1 (International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switz., Aug. 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919517. 
 10. Ontario Electricity Act 1998 (as amended), S.O. 1998, Chapter 15, 
Schedule A, Part II.1, art. 25.1(1), available at http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/ 
html/statutes/ english/elaws_statutes_98e15_e.htm. 
 11. Small-scale FIT projects fall within the remit of the Ontario Power 
Authority (OPA) microFIT program. See Ontario Power Authority, microFIT 
Program Overview v. 2.0, ONTARIO POWER COMPANY, available at http:// 
microfit.powerauthority.on.ca/sites/default/files/microFIT%20Program%20Over
view%20v%20%201%206%20FINAL%20.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter “OPA microFIT Program Overview”]. 
 12. Ontario Power Authority, Feed-In Tariff Program: Program Overview 
4, ONTARIO POWER AUTHORITY (2010), available at http://fit.powerauthority. 
on.ca/Storage/11160_FIT_Program_Overview_August_new_price_version_1.3.
1_final_for_posting-oct_27.pdf [hereinafter “OPA FIT Program Overview”]. 
 13. Id. at 30. 
 14. Calculated on the basis of a rooftop solar photovoltaic cell producing 
less than 250 kilowatts and the lower-tier price plan of the Ontario Energy 
Board. Ontario Power Authority, FIT Price Schedule, ONTARIO POWER 
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the world. For example, eighteen out of the twenty-seven European 
Union member-states have adopted schemes guaranteeing 
minimum resale prices for renewably produced electricity,15 as 
well as similar schemes existing within Australia,16 China,17 
India,18 South Africa,19 and Switzerland.20 Within the United 
States, FIT schemes have been adopted on a state, regional or 
municipal level in thirty-seven states21 including California,22 
                                                                                                             
 
AUTHORITY (Sept. 30, 2009), http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/fit-price-schedule; 
Ontario Energy Board, Electricity Prices, ONTARIO ENERGY BOARD, 
http://www.ontarioenergyboard. 
ca/OEB/Consumers/Electricity/Electricity+Prices (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 15. Misha Bechberger & Danyel Reiche, The spread of renewable energy 
feed-in tariffs (REFITs) in the EU-25, WIND-WORKS.ORG, http://www.wind-
works.org/FeedLaws/bechberger_reiche_fTheSpread%20of%20Feed%20Laws
%20in%20the%20EU.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).  
 16. See generally, Department of the Environment, Climate Change, Energy 
and Water, Electricity Feed-In Tariff Scheme, AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 
GOVERNMENT, http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/ 
144608/FiTFactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 17. See generally, Baizhen Chua, China Sets Solar Power Price to Boost 
Profits, Investment, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 1, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-01/chinese-government-sets-nationwide-solar-
photovoltaic-power-on-grid-prices.html. 
 18. See generally, Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission Toward 
Building SOLAR INDIA, INDIA.GOV.IN, http://india.gov.in/allimpfrms/alldocs/ 
15657.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions on Biomass 
Power Generation, GOVERNMENT OF INDIAN MINISTRY OF NEW AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/faq_biomass. 
htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 19. National Energy Regulator of South Africa, In the matter regarding 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs—Phase II by the National Energy Regulator 
of South Africa, NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR OF SOUTH AFRICA, 
http://www.nersa.org.za/Admin/DocumentUpload/UploadFiles/REFIT%20Phas
e%20II%20Reasons%20for%20Decision3531242010113153.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2012). 
 20. Compensatory feed-in remuneration: Important information on the 
registration process, SWISS FEDERAL OFFICE OF ENERGY, http://www.bfe.admin 
.ch/energie/00588/00589/00644/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=18371 (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012). 
 21. The full list of states in which FIT schemes are in force is Alabama, 
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. Database of State Incentives for Renewables & 
Efficiency—Financial Incentives, US DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, http://www. 
dsireusa.org/incentives/index.cfm?EE=1&RE=1&SPV=0&ST=0&searchtype=P
roduction&sh=1 (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). 
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Colorado,23 and Florida.24 FITs have already successfully 
contributed to increasing the amount of renewable energy 
produced. For example, the United Kingdom FIT scheme, 
introduced by the Labour Government in April 2010, contributed 
to a forty-one-fold increase in the domestic use of solar panels and 
a forty-five percent reduction in their cost price.25 Similarly 
successful has been the German FIT, which—in its twenty-one-
year existence—has contributed to the augmentation of renewable 
energy production in the energy sector from five to twenty 
percent.26 
The rationale for government support measures for renewable 
energy, such as FITs, is based on two strands of argument: 
economic and environmental. Within the former, renewable energy 
is recognized as being produced at quantities below the social 
optimum for two reasons.27 First, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
do not impose a direct cost upon the producer or consumer, unless 
operating within the jurisdiction of a carbon emissions trading 
scheme, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.28 
The inability to internalize the cost of GHG emissions upon society 
causes underpricing, and consequential overconsumption, of 
energy produced by non-renewable sources. Additionally, the 
inability of markets to account for the societal cost of GHG 
emissions in prices means that consumers and producers do not 
have a financial incentive to pursue innovation in methods of 
renewable energy production that aim to reduce the cost of GHG 
                                                                                                             
 
 22. Assem. B. 1969, 2005–2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).  
 23. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-127 (2010). 
 24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 377.806 (West 2011).  
 25. UK Government changes to Feed-in Tariffs—new and proposed, 
ENERGY SAVING TRUST, http://www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generating-
energy/ Getting-money-back/Feed-In-Tariffs-scheme-FITs/UK-Government-
changes-to-Feed-in-Tariffs-new-and-proposed (last updated July 2012); Fuel 
Costs per kWh, BIOMASS ENERGY CENTER, http://www.biomassenergycentre. 
org.uk/portal/page?_pageid=75,59188&_dad=portal (last visited Sept. 11, 2012). 
 26. Christoph H. Stefes, The German Solution: Feed-In Tariffs, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (updated Sept. 21, 2011, 5:42PM), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/us-
should-emulate-germanys-renewable-energy-model. 
 27. The social optimum is the point on the utility possibility frontier that 
maximizes social welfare; John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, and Gareth Miles, 
Oxford Dictionary of Economics (2009), available at http://www.oxford 
reference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t19.e3900. 
 28. Climate Action: Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated 
Nov. 15, 2010). 
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emissions to society.29 This market failure, which is termed the 
“environmental externality,” therefore results in the sub-optimal 
production of renewable energy. Second, analysts have pointed out 
that the market for energy is far from the perfect theoretical 
economic model, having been indelibly shaped by governmental 
policies supporting non-renewable methods of energy production 
for decades.30 While the removal of these subsidies offers the 
potential for a reduction in GHG emissions,31 their continued 
existence keeps non-renewably produced energy at market prices 
significantly lower than that produced by renewable methods. 
Therefore, for renewable energy to be competitive in the market, it 
must be supported to overcome pre-existing market failures.32 
Aside from the aforementioned market failures specific to 
renewable energy, support for government intervention in the 
renewable energy market is also premised on general industrial 
policy that aims to realize latent comparative advantage within 
markets should certain market failures be overcome.33 Within this 
strand of reasoning, entrepreneurs do not invest capital in the 
production of renewable energy because they cannot fully 
internalize the benefits of their investment. For example, “spill-
over” externalities may include the appropriation and exploitation 
of methods or knowledge by competitors,34 or increased 
productivity enjoyed by competitors or firms operating in other 
                                                                                                             
 29. Hussein Abaza, Vesile Kulaçoğlu, Anne Olhoff, Benjamin Simmons, 
Ludivine Tamiotti & Robert Teh, The United Nations Environment Program and 
the World Trade Organization, Trade and Climate Change 110–11, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2009), available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/ 
booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. 
 30. Robert Howse, Climate Change Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO 
Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis 5–6 (2010), available at http://www.iisd. 
org/pdf/2009/bali_2_copenhagen_subsidies_legal.pdf. 
 31. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook Insights, Looking 
at Energy Subsidies: Getting the Prices Right 10 (1999), http://www. 
worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo1999.pdf.  
 32. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 111.  
 33. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation 870 (O. Edenhofer, R. 
Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, K. Seyboth, P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. 
Eickemeir, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer & C. von Stechow eds., 2012), available at 
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf/view [hereinafter 
IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources]. 
 34. Mark Huberty & Georg Zachmann, Green Exports and the Global 
Product Space: Prospects for EU Industrial Policy 3–5 (Bruegel, Working Paper 
No. 2011/07, 2011), available at http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication- 
detail/publication/556-green-exports-and-the-global-product-space-prospects-for-
eu-industrial-policy/. 
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markets,35 both at the expense of the investor. Further, it is argued 
that the market for renewable energy suffers from capital market 
imperfections that cause a lack of available funding for 
entrepreneurs, due to either an over-estimation of the risk of 
investment caused by imperfect information regarding the product, 
or from the inability to demonstrate the effectiveness of a product 
or method on a small scale.36 This curtailment of capital flow 
causes a sub-optimal investment in renewable energy, which is 
used as a further justification for intervention in the market.  
In addition to economic arguments based on failures within the 
market for renewable energy, the place of renewable energy 
production as a means of climate change mitigation also provides a 
strong argument in favor of government support. Anthropogenic 
climate change—caused by GHG emissions resulting from human 
activity—has been deemed to be 90% likely the cause of the 
“unequivocal”37 climate change that threatens to irreversibly 
damage the world’s ecosystem.38 
Aside from pure environmental damage, climate change 
jeopardizes global security in myriad ways; it threatens to slash the 
economic prosperity of states,39 cause a rise in the global sea 
level,40 and endanger the health of millions of people worldwide.41 
Such is the speed of the global warming that even according to the 
most optimistic estimates, the world temperature will inevitably 
                                                                                                             
 35. This externality comprises both Jacobian (benefitting firms within the 
same market) and Marshallian (benefitting firms in different stages of the value 
chain) elements. Id. at 3. 
 36. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 111. This information failure can be 
overcome through the construction of government-funded demonstration 
models. See also Office of Carbon Capture and Storage, United Kingdom 
Department of Energy & Climate Change, UK Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) Commercial Scale Demonstration Program (Dec. 2010), http://www. 
decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%2
0mix/carbon%20capture%20and%20storage/1075-uk-ccs-commercialscale-
demonstration-programme-fu.pdf. 
 37. Lenny Bernstein et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 30 (2007), available at http://www. 
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. See also Elizabeth Muller, 
250 Years of Global Warming: Berkeley Earth Releases New Analysis, 
BERKELEY EARTH SURFACE TEMPERATURE (July 29, 2012), http://berkeleyearth. 
org/pdf/berkeley-earth-press-release-july-29.pdf. 
 38. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de 
Janiero, Braz., June 20–22, 2012, The Future We Want–Outcome Document ¶25, 
¶190, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.56, Annex I (July 24, 2012).  
 39. Nicholas Stern, The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change—
Summary of Conclusions (2006), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/ 
Summary_of_Conclusions.pdf. 
 40. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 46. 
 41. Id. at 48. 
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rise by between 1.8 and 2 degrees Celsius by the end of the twenty-
first century.42 Mitigation and adaptation are the two approaches 
advocated for dealing with this unprecedented change—the former 
focuses on the reduction of GHG emissions, which could be 
effectuated through inter alia the promotion of renewable 
energy,43 while the latter aims to reduce vulnerability of society to 
the predicted changes that global warming may cause, such as 
storms, droughts and floods.44 The power generation sector stands 
currently as the largest contributor to GHG emissions at just under 
25% of the total emissions in 2000, providing one of the greatest 
potentials for mitigation efforts.45 On the international level, 
coordination mechanisms that support the financing of mitigation 
efforts exist,46 but are focused on assisting developing and least-
developed countries in mitigation. As a result, they are not to be 
viewed as more than complementary efforts to policies enacted on 
the national level.47  
Both the economic and environmental arguments for market 
intervention and the lack of globally inclusive mechanisms to 
promote mitigation on the international plane place the burden of 
renewable energy promotion on national governments. Policies or 
laws adopted to pursue these ends by WTO members therefore 
potentially fall under the regulation of the WTO Agreements.48  
III. THE REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES WITHIN THE WTO  
The regulation of subsidies has been a contentious issue since 
the inclusion of the first attempts to discipline the use of subsidies 
in the WTO’s predecessor, the General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). It provided that subsidies increasing exports, or 
limiting imports, could be subject to a request for consultations by 
a member-state with a view to “the possibility of limiting the 
subsidization.”49 By the Tokyo Round of negotiations, from 1973 
to 1979, subsidies had grown to become “a more contentious 
                                                                                                             
 42. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 45; Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 4. 
 43. Bernstein et al., supra note 37, at 73. 
 44. Abaza et al., supra note 29, at 56. 
 45. Id. at 26. 
 46. Notably the Global Environment Facility, established by the World 
Bank in 1991. Global Environment Facility, About GEF (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef. 
 47. Cf. IPCC, Renewable Energy Sources, supra note 33, at 871.  
 48. It is worth noting that the promotion of renewable energy by national 
governments is now also inevitably based on considerations of profit for the 
national economy. The Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 2, at 9, 26. 
 49. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XVI §A(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 
61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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issue.”50 The Tokyo Round of negotiations was characterized by 
the pursuit of particular interests by certain GATT member-states51 
within a broader negotiating remit than had previously been 
undertaken.52 This served as a marked departure from the 
adherence to classical liberal economic principles that originally 
underpinned the conclusion of the GATT in 1947, and the 
pursuance of mercantilist self-interest by members resulted in a set 
of compromised agreements inevitably couched in vague 
language.53 The abuse of subsidies and countervailing measures 
aimed at offsetting the effect of a subsidy within an importing 
country was viewed by some members as a growing and distorting 
non-tariff influence on international trade and often protected 
inefficient production at the expense of competitive industries.54 
Led by the US and EEC, the increasing concern over subsidies 
resulted in the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code,55 whose 
provisions, while prohibiting certain subsidies,56 were so “vague as 
to invite differences of interpretation, some others [were] so weak 
as to provide few constraints over subsidy practices that adversely 
affected the interests of other countries.”57 The optional character 
of the Code exacerbated weaknesses caused by deficiencies in the 
text of the Code, such as the lack of a clear definition of a subsidy.  
                                                                                                             
 50. Peggy A. Clarke & Gary N. Horlick, The Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, in 1 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 682 (Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. 
Appleton & Michael G. Plummer eds., 2005).  
 51. Particularly the US, Japan, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the group of Less Economically Developed Countries. Stephen D. Krasner, 
The Tokyo Round: Particularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the 
Global Trading System, 23 (4) INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 491, 509 
(1979). 
 52. The Tokyo Round was notably the first round of negotiations in which 
the GATT membership discussed lowering non-tariff barriers––obstacles to 
trade which stem from any action that is not an import tariff upon goods. Non-
tariff negotiations in the Tokyo Round included agreements upon subsidies and 
countervailing measures, customs valuation, government procurement, technical 
barriers and standards, and import licensing procedures. Id. at 508. 
 53. Id. at 517. 
 54. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Negotiations, 
Statement by GATT Director-General on Tokyo Round, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 
553, 569 (1979).  
 55. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th 
Supp.) at 56 (1979) [hereinafter “Tokyo Round Subsidies Code”]. 
 56. Notably export subsidies. Id. at art. 9. 
 57. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Meeting 
of 16-17 March 1987, MTN.GNG/NG10/1 ¶5 (Mar. 27, 1987), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020058.pdf.  
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The successor of the Tokyo Round of negotiations, the 
Uruguay Round, started in February 1987. The Uruguay Round 
spanned more negotiating material than the Tokyo Round and, 
crucially, reiterated the importance of lowering non-tariff barriers 
to trade such as subsidies. Subsidies and countervailing measures 
were given a separate “negotiating track” to other non-tariff 
barriers, which manifested the importance placed on the 
conclusion of a new agreement on the subject and implicitly 
acknowledged the failures of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.58 
While issues did arise in the negotiating process, GATT members 
quickly agreed upon, and negotiated within, the framework of a 
“traffic light” system of subsidies, which classified subsidies as 
either non-actionable (green), actionable (amber) or prohibited 
(red). Substantive negotiation from 1989 onwards therefore 
focused on coming to agreement upon the definitions of each of 
these three kinds of subsidies.59 These negotiations resulted in the 
proposal of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures in 1991,60 which was adopted with minor changes as 
part of the conclusion of the Round in 1994.  
Currently, therefore, the regulation of subsidies under the 
existing WTO Agreements falls predominantly within the remit of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(hereinafter “SCM Agreement”).61 Should a WTO member believe 
that subsidies implemented or directed by another WTO member-
state are in breach of the provisions of the SCM Agreement, they 
may request consultations with the other member in pursuance of a 
mutually-acceptable solution to the dispute.62 If a mutually agreed 
solution is not reached within thirty days (for prohibited subsidies) 
                                                                                                             
 58. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 41 (1994). 
 59. Id. at 200. 
 60. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 
1991).  
 61. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter “SCM Agreement”]. Agricultural subsidies are 
regulated within the framework of the Agreement on Agriculture. Agreement on 
Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. While outside the remit of this 
article, it should be noted that FITs have been challenged under Article III.4 of 
the GATT and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures. Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter “TRIMs Agreement”]. 
See also Canada—Renewables, supra note 6, at 3; Canada—Feed-in Tariff, 
supra note 6, at 3. 
 62. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at arts. 4.1, 7.1. 
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or sixty days (for actionable subsidies), the complaining member 
may request that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
comprised of the complete WTO membership, to convene a panel 
to adjudicate the dispute.63 If the complaining member is 
successful in contending before a panel that another member’s 
policy is a prohibited subsidy under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement before a WTO dispute settlement panel, the panel can 
recommend removal of the offending subsidy by the implementing 
member.64 Should the panel’s determination not be abided by, the 
complaining member may win authorization to put in place 
“appropriate countermeasures,”65 which has in the past been 
understood to mean trade restrictions of a quantum equivalent to 
the full amount of the illegal subsidy.66 If a WTO panel deems a 
subsidy to be an illegal actionable subsidy under Article 5 of the 
SCM Agreement, the implementing or directing member must take 
measures to remove the “adverse effects” of the subsidy, or 
withdraw the subsidy completely.67 If the member does not take 
effective measures following a ruling of illegality, the complaining 
member may gain authorization to put in place “countermeasures, 
commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects 
determined to exist.”68 Panel reports in both instances may be 
appealed to the highest WTO tribunal, the Appellate Body, which 
makes a definitive determination on the dispute.69 
Based upon an analysis of the WTO Agreements and 
jurisprudence, the following three sections introduce lessons that 
should be borne in mind in the policy design stage of renewable 
energy subsidies, and which intend to function on three different 
levels. The first is aimed at creating support measures that do not 
fall within the SCM definition of a subsidy. The second is aimed at 
ensuring that a support measure that does fall within the definition 
of a subsidy evades being deemed an illegal subsidy. The third and 
fourth lessons pertain to ensuring that the subsidy, even if it is 
designated a prohibited subsidy or illegal actionable subsidy, may 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at arts. 4.4, 7.4. 
 64. Id. at art. 4.7. 
 65. Id. at art. 4.10. 
 66. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign 
Sales Corporations” WT/DS108/AB/R ¶90 (Feb. 24, 2000), download available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm [hereinafter 
“US—FSC”]; Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil—Export Financing Programme 
for Aircraft—Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and 
Article 4.11of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/46arb_e.pdf. 
 67. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 7.8. 
 68. Id. at art. 7.9. 
 69. Id. at arts. 4.9, 7.7. 
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avail itself of the exception potentially available under Article XX 
of the GATT. 
IV. LESSON ONE—THE PROSPECT OF NON-SPECIFICITY  
In order to be classified as a subsidy within the meaning of 
Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement, the support measure must 
meet three cumulative criteria.70 First, the purported subsidy must 
be a measure or policy adopted by a governmental or public body 
which provides a financial contribution to its recipients.71 
Financial support is understood in a wide sense, with Article 1.1(a) 
exhaustively listing “financial contribution” as the direct transfers 
of funds,72 provision of loan guarantees,73 the foregoing of revenue 
otherwise due (for example, tax breaks),74 provision of goods or 
services other than general infrastructure, or the purchase of 
goods.75 Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) also encompasses the case in which a 
government “entrusts or directs” a private body to effectuate a 
financial contribution as understood in the preceding provisions of 
the Article (hence encompassing the scenario where a private 
energy provider is directed to run a FIT program by 
government).76 Second, the measure must confer a benefit on the 
recipient under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, which has 
been understood by the Appellate Body to mean “mak[ing] the 
recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent that 
                                                                                                             
 70. Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement are “general provisions” of the 
Agreement, which define a subsidy and the circumstances in which a subsidy is 
to be considered specific, respectively. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at arts. 
1, 2. 
 71. Id. at art. 1.1(a). 
 72. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(i).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii). This provision is manifestly aimed at the 
inclusion of tax breaks into the concept of subsidies, and is to be understood—
presuming a generalized corporate tax regime—as foregoing revenue that would 
be collected but for the measure in place. US—FSC, supra note 66. See also 
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R ¶¶ 90–94 (May 31, 2000). 
 75. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii). 
 76. Entrusting or directing a private body under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) was 
understood by the panel in United States—Measures Treating Export Restraints 
as Subsidies as being composed of three elements: (1) an explicit affirmative 
action, be it delegation or command; (2) addressed to a particular party; (3) the 
object of which is a particular duty or task. Report of the Panel, United States—
Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R ¶8.29 (Jun. 29, 
2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanelsfull/us-
exportrestraints(panel)(full).pdf. See also Clarke & Horlick, supra note 50, at 
691. 
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contribution.”77 This does not necessarily mean that the benefit 
conferred will be equal to the financial contribution in each case, 
and it is to be determined with reference to the conditions that the 
recipient would otherwise have been exposed to in the 
marketplace.78 Third, the purported subsidy must be specific, 
under the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. The 
requirement of specificity was designed as “an initial screening 
mechanism to winnow out only those foreign subsidies which truly 
are broadly available and widely used throughout an economy.”79 
Specificity is understood as either the limitation of a subsidy to a 
certain type of enterprise, whether explicitly based on the 
characteristics of the enterprise80 or their geographical location,81 
or limitation to a certain group of enterprises as the de facto effect 
of the subsidy.82 Finally, subsidies falling within the definitions of 
prohibited subsidies under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement are 
automatically considered to be specific.83 
The first lesson relies upon the above-mentioned specificity 
criteria that must be present for support to fall within the definition 
of a subsidy for the purposes of the SCM Agreement. Originally 
intended to ensure that government spending upon public goods 
that are used incidentally by domestic producers such as roads and 
police did not come within the remit of the SCM Agreement, the 
specificity criteria could equally be used to exempt subsidies for 
renewable energy from regulation under the Agreement.84 Like 
transportation infrastructure and police forces, the nature of 
renewable energy as a public good suggests that governments 
should adopt broad climate change mitigation support strategies in 
order to maximize the positive externality of mitigation efforts. 
While these benefits would be global—and hence not fully benefit 
the domestic economy—the economic consequences of the 
harshest effects of global warming and the potential effects on a 
highly interconnected global economy certainly indicate that states 
have a vested interest in pursuing broad mitigation policies. Once 
it is decided to pursue a broad policy, a government could 
                                                                                                             
 77. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R ¶157 (Aug. 2, 1999), available at http:// 
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/canada-aircraft(ab).pdf. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Clarke & Horlick, supra note 50, at 694. 
 80. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 2.1(a). 
 81. Id. at art. 2.2. 
 82. Id. at art. 2.1(b). 
 83. Id. at art. 2.3. 
 84. ANDREW GUZMAN & JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 414 (2009). 
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effectively avoid specificity if they instituted a horizontal, 
generally accessible subsidy based on neutral economic criteria, 
such as one that is available throughout all sectors of the economy 
and contingent upon adoption of a technology or process that 
affords a certain level of GHG reduction from pre-existing 
emission levels. The adoption of such a policy takes advantage of 
Article 2.1(b) and footnote 2 of the SCM Agreement, which 
provide respectively that: 
Article 2.1(b): Where the granting authority, or the 
legislation pursuant to which the granting authority 
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions 
governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy, 
specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is 
automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly 
adhered to. . . . 85 
SCM Agreement, note 2: Objective criteria or conditions, as 
used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, 
which do not favour [sic] certain enterprises over others, and 
which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, 
such as number of employees or size of enterprise.86 
While a generally available subsidy based on objective criteria 
could evade the remit of the SCM Agreement, it would not be 
without difficulties. First, the political and financial viability of 
extending such a subsidy to all sectors of the economy—as would 
be necessary to avoid specificity—is questionable. A cut in fossil 
fuel subsidies could go some way to funding the policy, yet the 
financial burden of and the political will for the adoption of a 
general subsidy would differ greatly between countries, and 
feasibility would have to be assessed on a country-by-country 
basis. Second, the administrative burden of maintaining such a 
subsidy would inevitably be large, and may extend the adoption of 
such a subsidy beyond the reach of some countries. The world’s 
largest GHG-emitting countries, however, are those within the G20 
group of developed countries, which have a demonstrated 
willingness and capability to resource large renewable energy 
promotion programs.87 The additional burden that a general 
                                                                                                             
 85. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 2.1(b) (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. at art. 2.1(b), n. 2 (emphasis added). 
 87. For example, twelve member-states of the G20 (including the US, China, 
South Korea, and the EU 27) responded to the global economic crisis of 2008–
2009 by committing to stimulus packages focused on the green energy sector that 
amounted to $194 billion. The Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 2, at 26. 
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subsidy may cause does not, therefore, seem out of reach of those 
countries in which its application may be most effective.  
V. LESSON TWO—THE ABSOLUTENESS OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
Since the expiration of a category of virtuous “non-actionable” 
subsidies that were exempt from the provisions of the SCM 
Agreement in 2000,88 subsidies now fall within two categories—
either prohibited or actionable subsidies. Prohibited subsidies are 
those that are, in law or fact, contingent upon export 
performance—tied to anticipated or actual export earnings89—or 
those subsidies whose provision is contingent on the use of 
domestic over imported goods.90 While support measures falling 
within the definition of prohibited subsidies are illegal regardless 
of their effects, the illegality of actionable subsidies rests upon an 
effects-based analysis, providing that subsidies shall be deemed 
illegal if they cause “adverse effects” to the interests of other 
member-states, including injury to domestic producers,91 
nullification or impairment of direct or indirect benefits conferred 
upon a member by virtue of the GATT,92 or cause serious 
prejudice to another member’s interests.93 The circumstances in 
which it is to be considered that serious prejudice occurred are 
listed in Article 6 of the SCM Agreement, and include the scenario 
in which “the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the 
imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the 
subsidizing Member.”94 
It is worth noting that all renewable energy subsidies that have 
been subject to consultations, or subject to requests to convene 
dispute settlement panels, within the WTO have had a purportedly 
explicit discriminatory or protectionist character, hence falling 
within the definition of a prohibited subsidy. For example, the 
Ontarian FIT described above made eligibility for participation in 
the FIT and microFIT schemes contingent on a domestic content 
requirement, stating that a minimum amount of 50% of goods and 
services for wind projects, and 60% for solar projects, shall come 
                                                                                                             
 88. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8.2. Protected subsidies included 
subsidies for research activities, subsidies to support disadvantaged regions, and 
subsidies to help adaption to new environmental regulation. 
 89. Id. at art. 3.1(a) n. 4. 
 90. Id. at art. 3.1(b). 
 91. Id. at art. 5(a). 
 92. Id. at art. 5(b). 
 93. Id. at art. 5(c). 
 94. SCM Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 6.3(a). 
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from Ontario.95 Similarly, Chinese subsidies for wind power 
equipment that were subject to a complaint by the US in 2010 were 
purportedly contingent upon export performance and domestic 
content requirements.96 
The second lesson is pertinent to government support measures 
that fall within the definition of a subsidy, as understood by the 
SCM Agreement. Non-discrimination is a key concept in WTO 
law, and the provisions under which discriminatory subsidies may 
be challenged are numerous. First, as noted above, Articles 3 and 5 
of the SCM Agreement respectively provide that subsidies cannot 
de jure97 or de facto98 discriminate between domestic and foreign 
goods. Discriminatory subsidies may also be challenged under 
Article III: 4 of the GATT and Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, 
which prohibit measures that afford imported goods less favorable 
regulatory treatment than that enjoyed by domestic goods. Finally, 
in order for the subsidy to avail itself of the exception under 
Article XX of the GATT, examined below, the chapeau requires 
that a measure cannot be arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminatory.99 The second lesson is simple and absolute: a 
renewable energy subsidy that is discriminatory, in law or fact, will 
not withstand a test of legality under the laws of the WTO.  
VI. LESSONS THREE AND FOUR—LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS AND OPEN AND TRANSPARENT PROCESSES 
While the “safe-haven” category of non-actionable subsidies 
has expired, commentators have argued that exceptions to the rules 
of the GATT, available under Article XX, are equally applicable to 
the provisions of the SCM Agreement. Article XX provides 
exemptions for certain sensitive or virtuous policies, including 
those that aim to protect animal, human, and plant life or health,100 
public morals,101 condemn prison labor,102 and—most pertinently 
                                                                                                             
 95. OPA FIT Program Overview, supra note 12, at 6. For the microFIT 
program, domestic content requirements are limited to projects using solar 
photovoltaic cells, which must be composed of 60% domestic content. OPA 
microFIT Program Overview, supra note 11, at 12. 
 96. See United Steelworkers, United Steelworkers' Section 301 Petition 
Demonstrates China's Green Technology Practices Violate WTO Rules, 
http://assets.usw.org/releases/misc/section-301.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). 
 97. By contingency upon export performance of the product or upon the use 
of domestic products in the production of the good. 
 98. For example, subsidies cannot cause “adverse effects” on another 
members market.  
 99. GATT, supra note 49, at art. XX. 
 100. Id. at art. XX(b).  
 101. Id. at art. XX(a). 
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for our purposes—are aimed at the conservation of natural 
resources.103 Leaving open the question of the applicability of 
Article XX exceptions to agreements outside the GATT, it is 
nevertheless important to consider what steps a member should 
take if they wish to avail themselves of the exceptions.104  
In order to assess if a provision may fall within an Article XX 
exception, it is necessary to carry out a two-step analysis. First, the 
provision must fall within the definition of one of the exempt 
categories, of which we will take subsection (g) as an example, it 
being the most readily applicable to renewable energy promotion 
policies.105 Second, the policy must pass the test under the 
“chapeau” of Article XX, which outlaws measures that are 
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminative, or those that are 
disguised restrictions on international trade.  
Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating to 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.” This can be divided into two distinct 
requirements. First, the measure must be related to the 
conservation of exhaustible resources. In United States—Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“US—
Shrimp”), the Appellate Body confirmed that Article XX(g) was 
understood to cover the conservation of inanimate resources, such 
as fossil fuels, as well as measures designed to conserve 
exhaustible natural living resources, hence comprising renewable 
                                                                                                             
 
 102. Id. at art. XX(e). 
 103. Id. at art. XX(g). 
 104. On the applicability of Article XX to the SCM Agreement, see Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Submission by International Institute on Sustainable 
Development, Canadian Environmental Law Association & Ecojustice Canada, 
Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector 
(DS412) (May 10, 2012), available at, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/ecojustice 
_amicus_curiae_brief.pdf; Daniel Peat, The Wrong Rules for the Right Energy: 
the WTO SCM Agreement and Subsidies for Renewable Energy, 24 ENVTL. L. & 
MGMT. 7 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1998240; Wilke, supra note 9, at 8–12; Robert Howse, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Trade Law and 
Renewable Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff Barriers, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ 
DITC/TED/2008/5 11–14 (2009), available at http://archive.unctad.org/trade_ 
env/test1/publications/UNCTAD_DITC_TED_2008_5.pdf. 
 105. Also, it should be noted that the requirements to invoke art. XX(b) are 
more difficult to fulfill than those under art. XX(g), particularly because it must 
be shown that the measure is necessary for the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health. Michael Hertel, Climate-Change-Related Trade Measures 
and Article XX: Defining Discrimination in Light of the Principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 653, 669 (2011). 
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energy promotion measures.106 In light of the depletion of the 
world’s fossil fuel resources, as well as the damage that climate 
change causes to the world’s ecosystems more generally, measures 
promoting renewable energy are manifestly related to this 
objective. Second, the measure must be integrated with measures 
restricting domestic consumption and production. The 
compatibility of renewable energy policies with this criterion will 
therefore depend on the structure of each specific policy or 
measure, but should be met if the implementing government has a 
general climate change mitigation policy in place.  
The second step that must be passed is that of the chapeau of 
Article XX, which was also dealt with comprehensively in US-
Shrimp. In that case, the measures at issue were United States 
regulatory requirements that imported shrimp must be caught using 
harvesting methods that did not adversely affect sea turtles. 
Specifically, in order for shrimp to be exported to the US, states 
must have their regulatory framework certified to the effect that all 
shrimp trawlers used “turtle excluding devices,” which prevent sea 
turtles from being caught in the trawler’s net when shrimp 
fishing.107 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand brought a case to 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism alleging that the US 
requirements breached certain provisions of the GATT. At the 
panel stage of proceedings, the US conceded that the measures in 
place constituted an illegal quantitative restriction under the 
meaning of Article XI GATT, but argued that the requirements 
under the Act were justified by Article XX(g). The Appellate Body 
recognized that the US regulations prima facie fit the requirements 
of subsection (g), and continued to analyze them in light of the 
chapeau of Article XX. The Chapeau states that:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measure . . . .108 
                                                                                                             
 106. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R ¶¶128–131 (Oct. 12, 
1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf 
[hereinafter “US-Shrimp”]. 
 107. See Sea Turtle Conservation; Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 FR 
24244, Pub. L. No. 101–62, 103 Stat. 988, § 609(b)(2) (1987). 
 108. GATT, supra note 49, at art. XX (emphasis added). 
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In deeming that the US regulations constituted an unjustifiable 
and arbitrary discrimination between countries, the Appellate Body 
relied predominantly on four characteristics of the implementation 
of the US rules. First, the Appellate Body noted that the US rules 
obliged states wanting to export to the US to adopt effectively the 
same regulatory standards as the US in order to be able to exercise 
their rights to trade under the GATT,109 even if different conditions 
prevailed in those states.110 Further, even states using identical 
methods as those required by the US law were excluded from 
exporting to the US simply because the state in question had not 
been certified as meeting US standards. This prompted the 
Appellate Body to state:  
[W]e believe that discrimination results not only when 
countries in which the same conditions prevail are 
differently treated, but also when the application of the 
measure at issue does not allow for any enquiry [sic] into 
the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the 
conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.111 
Aside from the adoption of this “single, rigid and 
unbending”112 regime that did not account for circumstantial 
differences, the Appellate Body identified a second discriminatory 
characteristic of the US policy. They found the asymmetry of 
treatment afforded to exporting states by the US administration to 
be discriminatory, with those in the wider Caribbean/western 
Atlantic region given a period three times longer in which to adapt 
their regulatory systems than other exporting states.113 Third, the 
Appellate Body gave weight to the failure of the US:  
[T]o engage the appellees, as well as other Members 
exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, across-
the-board negotiations with objective of concluding 
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and 
conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import 
prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other 
members.114 
                                                                                                             
 109. US-Shrimp, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 161–62. 
 110. Id. at ¶ 164. 
 111. Id. at ¶ 165. 
 112. Id. at ¶ 177. 
 113. Id. at ¶ 173. 
 114. Id. at ¶ 166. 
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The US did, however, engage in dialogue with some other WTO 
members towards finding mutually acceptable solutions.115 This 
approach to negotiations was, in the view of the Appellate Body, 
“plainly discriminatory and, in our view, unjustifiable.”116 Finally, 
the Appellate Body emphasized the “non-transparent and ex parte 
nature of the internal government procedures . . . throughout the 
certification processes . . .”117 particularly the lack of formal denial 
of certification for some states, and the lack of reasons given for 
denial. This consolidated the conclusion that the US regulations 
constituted both unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.118 
While the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp did not find it 
necessary to examine if the US measures constituted a “disguised 
restriction on international trade” under the chapeau of Article XX, 
GATT panels in the United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna 
and Tuna Products from Canada119 and United States—Imports of 
Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies120 cases examined this 
issue, coming to differing opinions on whether publicity of a 
measure by a public authority automatically ruled out its 
qualification as a “disguised restriction.” This division was settled 
by the Appellate Body in another case, United States—Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,121 in which the 
Appellate Body held that a “concealed or unannounced restriction 
or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the 
meaning of ‘disguised restriction.’”122 This interpretation was 
followed by the panel in European Communities—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,123 which 
continued to determine that the intent of a measure should be based 
on an analysis of its “design, architecture and revealing 
                                                                                                             
 115. US-Shrimp, supra note 106, at ¶ 169. Specifically with Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua and Peru in the framework of the Inter-American Sea Turtle 
Convention. See Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles art. XV, Dec. 1, 1996, 2164 U.N.T.S. 29, 31. 
 116. US-Shrimp, supra note 104, at ¶ 172. 
 117. Id. at ¶ 183. 
 118. Id. at ¶ 184. 
 119. Report of the Panel, United States—Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and 
Tuna Products from Canada, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1982). 
 120. Report of the Panel, United States—Imports of Certain Automotive 
Spring Assemblies, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 108 (1983). 
 121. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/2-9.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 24–25. 
 123. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R ¶ 8.232 (Sep. 18, 2000), 
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structure.”124 An effective subsidy for renewable energy must, 
therefore, not manifest any characteristics of a restriction on trade, 
which is to be considered in conjunction with the non-
discrimination mandated under the first part of the chapeau of 
Article XX. 
The third and fourth lessons, taken together, are aimed at 
ensuring that a subsidy, even if deemed illegal, may avail itself of 
the potential exception available under Article XX of the GATT. 
While necessary, but not singularly sufficient, to come within the 
remit of an exception, the lessons present the most important steps 
in fulfilling the cumulative criteria identified in the preceding 
analysis. The third lesson suggests that subsidies should have a 
clear and explicit link to goals or targets established by 
international agreements, such as those set by Annex B countries 
within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.125 Explicit reference 
to international targets serves two purposes in relation to Article 
XX. First and most importantly, it augments the “relatedness” of 
the subsidy to the goal of the conservation of natural resources, 
required by the wording of Article XX(g). Second, an explicit link 
demonstrates to a WTO panel that the policy does not constitute a 
“disguised restriction on trade,” as prohibited under the chapeau of 
Article XX. In addition, reference to international GHG-reduction 
targets could usefully serve as the basis for objective criteria 
governing the eligibility for subsidies, as examined in the first 
lesson. An explicit link could be included within, for example, 
implementing legislation providing that energy efficiency devices 
that contributed by a certain percentage towards the attainment of 
the WTO member’s internationally agreed GHG reduction target 
were to be recipients of government support.  
The fourth lesson takes inspiration from the US-Shrimp case to 
suggest that WTO member-state governments should engage other 
members in dialogue regarding, and allow them to comment upon, 
climate change mitigation subsidies when they are in their 
formative stages. By doing this, the implementing state is 
following the optimal method for ensuring that their support 
policies are not challenged in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism—they address the concerns of other members and open 
channels of dialogue that may alter the design of the policy to a 
mutually-acceptable solution before a trade dispute arises. This 
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transparency should continue into the implementation phase of the 
policy, enabling the implementing state to make manifest to other 
WTO members that no “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” 
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX is taking place. 
Both the third and fourth lessons are cost-effective and feasible 
methods of ensuring that a renewable energy subsidy meets the 
requisites of Article XX. What remains to be seen, however, is the 
willingness of WTO panels, or the Appellate Body, to explicitly 
recognize the applicability of Article XX to provisions contained 
within agreements outside the GATT.126  
VII. CONCLUSION  
The international trade regime is at a critical juncture in its 
history. With the conclusion or modification of multilateral trade 
agreements in the near future rendered impossible by the impasse 
in the Doha Round negotiations, WTO members should account 
for the rigors of the current WTO disciplines in the formative 
stages of their policy design to avoid the undesirable result of a 
determination of illegality. After comprehensively reviewing the 
WTO legal texts and Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
jurisprudence, this Comment suggested four lessons that should be 
followed by member-states wishing to implement subsidies for 
renewable energy. First, it suggested that financial support from 
renewable energy production or equipment could avoid 
“specificity” under the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM 
Agreement—and hence avoid falling under the rules for subsidies 
in the WTO—by effective integration into an objective, neutral and 
horizontal comprehensive climate change mitigation policy. 
Second, it noted that the principle of non-discrimination should be 
strictly adhered to in the context of renewable energy subsidies in 
the international trade regime. Third, it argued that linking these 
comprehensive climate change policies to international agreements 
and commitments could assist in helping the policy either avoid 
specificity or, failing that, to fall within the exception covered 
under Article XX(g). Finally, this Comment pointed out the 
importance of transparency and inclusiveness throughout the 
design and implementation stages of the policy process, and 
highlighted the desirability of mutually acceptable solutions as 
opposed to judicially settled disputes.  
The WTO presents an opportunity for the world to increase 
members’ long-run wealth, yet this cannot be allowed to impact 
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the obligation that the global community has to mitigate 
anthropogenic climate change. Subsidies for renewable energy are 
vulnerable to legal challenge within the WTO, whether such a 
challenge is motivated by political, economic or legal reasons, 
placing the burden on implementing states to ensure legality under 
the existing international trade rules. In the short-run, appropriate 
policy design based upon a thorough analysis of the obligations 
binding WTO members is the most effective method of ensuring 
the legality of subsidies for renewable energy.  
 
